Florida Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 1

June 1952

Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings
Ernest R. Bartley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ernest R. Bartley, Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings, 5 Fla. L. Rev. 119 (1952).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Bartley: Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 11:49:35 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Ernest R. Bartley, Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings, 5 U. FLA. L. REV.
119 (1952).
ALWD 7th ed.
Ernest R. Bartley, Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev.
119 (1952).
APA 7th ed.
Bartley, E. R. (1952). Federal review of state criminal proceedings. University of
Florida Law Review, 5(2), 119-132.
Chicago 17th ed.
Ernest R. Bartley, "Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings," University of
Florida Law Review 5, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 119-132
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Ernest R. Bartley, "Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings" (1952) 5:2 U Fla L
Rev 119.
AGLC 4th ed.
Ernest R. Bartley, 'Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings' (1952) 5(2)
University of Florida Law Review 119
MLA 9th ed.
Bartley, Ernest R. "Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings." University of
Florida Law Review, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 1952, pp. 119-132. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Ernest R. Bartley, 'Federal Review of State Criminal Proceedings' (1952) 5 U Fla L
Rev 119
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1952], Art. 1

University of Florida Law Review
VOL. V

SUMMER

1952

No. 2

FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
ERNEST

R. BARTLEY

Even the casual student of public law cannot fail to be aware
that the work of the United States Supreme Court involving review
of criminal cases has increased greatly in the past two or three decades.
Two factors have contributed to this growth: (1) the constantly expanding number of federal criminal cases as Congress rapidly adds
to the list of federal crimes;' and (2) review of the criminal cases de-

'The Judiciary Act of 1789 contained no provision for review of federal criminal
cases, either by circuit courts or the Supreme Court. 2 STAT. 59 (1802) gave the
circuit courts power to certify questions, upon division of opinion, to the Supreme
Court, thus affording a limited form of review. Appeal as of right by writ of
error from the district courts to the circuit courts was allowed by an 1879 statute,
20 STAT. 354. In 1891 appeal directly from the district court to the Supreme Court
was permitted in all cases of "infamous crimes," 26 STAT. 827. Since the Court
In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891), construed this phrase as inclusive of all crimes
for which a person might be sentenced to a penitentiary, the Supreme Court found
itself immediately overburdened with the review of petty crimes. The right of
appeal to the Supreme Court was therefore limited to capital crimes in 1897, 29
STAT. 492; and in 1911 even this limited right was abolished, 36 STAT. 1157. Such
a limitation was acceptable because the circuit courts of appeal, created in 1891,
afforded a medium of review. There is now no appeal as of right to the United
States Supreme Court in federal criminal cases except when the party relies on
a state statute which has been held by the court of appeals to be invalid under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 28 U.S.C. §1254(2) (Supp.
1950).
Since 1925 appeal as of right from decisions of state courts in criminal cases
is possible only when the validity of a state act under the Federal Constitution
is challenged and sustained or when a federal statute or treaty is involved and
its validity denied by the state court, 28 U.S.C. §1257 (1), (2) (Supp. 1950). Prior
to 1925 a defendant could take an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from
the decision of the highest state court in a considerable number of cases.
At the present time review of criminal cases, of both federal and state origin,
is permitted principally on certiorari. The basis for writs of certiorari to state

[119]
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cided by state courts to insure compliance by states with the nebulous
requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the more specific prohibitions of the United States Constitu2
tion applicable to state criminal procedure.
The task of the Court in its review of federal criminal decisions
is, as compared with review of state judgments, a relatively simple
one. First, the Court in interpreting the acts of the Congress 3 is not
limited to a determination of whether a constitutional guarantee has
been infringed, 4 whereas it must accept the interpretation by state
courts of state statutes. 5 Further, in acting on federal criminal cases
the Court has the advantage of being able to review cases tried under
a single code of criminal procedure applicable to the entire federal
criminal system.
There are areas of justifiable concern for the student of public
law who investigates the operations of the Court in reviewing federal
criminal cases. 6 This article is immediately concerned, however, with
the role that the United States Supreme Court plays in the infinitely
more complex area of the review of criminal cases that have originated
in the various state courts.
Numerous decisions, 7 including the recent and dramatic case of
Wolf v. Colorado,8 evidence clearly that the Court holds that all of

courts is contained in 28 U.S.C. §1257(3) (Supp. 1950). See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
APPEALS IN AMERICA 244-248 (1939).
2
See e.g., the restrictions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, U.S.
CONsT. Art. I, §10.
3
For a discussion of the Court's consideration of federal criminal appeals see
Fraenkel, The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Criminal justice, 275
ANNALS OF AMER. ACADEMY OF POL. 8= SOC. SCIENCE 86, 95 (1951).
4
See District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 3 (1950).
3See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 79 (1941); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1926).
6E.g., the writer finds the decision in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950), particularly disturbing because of its allowance of power to federal officers
making searches incident to arrest. In his dissent Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed
by far the better rule in aid of the preservation of the historic constitutional right
of privacy. The writer would agree with Frankfurter that the "progress is too
easy from police action unscrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state."
Id. at 82. But cf. United States v. Jeffers, 72 Sup. Ct. 93 (1951).
7E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110

U.S. 516 (1884).
8338 U.S. 25 (1949). In the tradition of the Wolf case is the case of Stefanelli
v. Minard, 72 Sup. Ct. 118 (1951).
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me guarantees of the first eight amendments to the Constitution
have not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. The
attempt of Mr. Justice Black, represented in his dissent in Adamson
v. California and other cases, to blanket into the Fourteenth Amendment the protections of the first eight amendments has not received
substantial support from the bench or the bar.
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment compel consistency of criminal processes, either as between the states'0 or among the states and
the Federal Government.:" A state is free to regulate the criminal
procedure of its courts unless in so doing it violates some fundamental principle of justice.' 2 This is true even though a federal right is
being defended in the state court.' 3 The violation of a fundamental
principle of justice, however, runs athwart the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 In such cases the burden falls on the
Supreme Court to resolve the demands of the United States Constitution and the intricate and varied criminal law procedures of the
states. The problems facing the Court as it seeks a solution are both
mechanical and substantive.
THE CouRT's

DIscRETioNARY JURISDICTION

The Court is faced every year with an increasing number of applications for certiorari to review state criminal convictions.'s The
9332 U.S. 46 (1947).
'oSee Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.

319, 324 (1937).
"Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
12See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
'13E.g., in Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948), the Court in a per curiam
opinion stated that it is a matter for local procedure whether the right should
be vindicated in action for habeas corpus rather than by a writ of error. It is a
settled principle of law that the states are not bound, as a part of due process, to
accord appellate review of criminal convictions, Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272
(1895). A discriminatory denial of the right, however, is a violation of the 14th
Amendment, Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
'4Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
'5These include many in forma pauperis petitions. In 1930, 22 petitions for
certiorari in forma pauperis were filed. In 1946 the number was 528, and in the
1948-1949 term 455. Chief Justice Vinson noted in an address before the American
Bar Association on Sept. 7, 1949: "Many, if not most, of the cases in which the
Court has spelled out the requirements of a fair trial under the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment have come up as in forma pauperis petitions." 69
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time that the Court can allot to reviewing criminal cases is limited;
it cannot hear them all. Many lack any basis upon which review
might be granted. It is a most difficult task to choose among the many
issues presented by the remaining applications. Since the granting of
a petition for a writ of certiorari is a matter of discretion and not of
right, the granting or denying of a petition frequently involves an
estimate by the Court of the relative importance of the problem presented by a particular case. 16
A petition is granted upon the approval of four justices. The
deaths of Justices Murphy and Rutledge reduced the group of four
which had granted certiorari in many criminal cases involving alleged violations of civil rights. The number of cases of this type
in which certiorari was granted decreased immediately. Appraising
this situation, Professor John P. Frank said in his review of the 19491950 term of court:' 7
"The most important fact about the five criminal procedure
cases, four of which were decided against the defendant, was
Sup. Ct. v. viii (1949).
16Chief Justice Vinson emphasized this in saying: "During the past term of
Court, only about 15% of the petitions for certiorari were granted, and this
figure itself is considerably higher than the average in recent years. While a
great many of the 85% that were denied were far from frivolous, far too many
reveal a serious misconception on the part of counsel concerning the role of the
Supreme Court in our federal system .... Those of you whose petitions for certiorari are granted by the Supreme Court will know . . . that you are, in a sense,
prosecuting or defending class actions; that you represent not only your clients,
but tremendously important principles, upon which are based the plans, hopes,
and aspirations of many people throughout the country. Lawyers might be welladvised, in preparing petitions for certiorari, to spend a little less time discussing
the merits of their cases and a little more time demonstrating why it is important
that the Court should hear them .... What the Court is interested in is the actual,
practical effect of the disputed decision - its consequences for other litigants and
in other situations. A petition for certiorari should explain why it is vital that
the question involved be decided finally by the Supreme Court. If it only succeeds in demonstrating that the decision below may be erroneous, it has not fulfilled its purpose." 69 Sup. Ct. v, vi (1949).
17The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 1, 25
(1950). It is interesting to note that this premonition of Professor Frank's appears
to have been borne out in Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950). Justices
Black and Douglas, who with Murphy and Rutledge had constituted the block
of four who most commonly agreed to take certiorari for the purpose of considering
matters of this kind, dissented, saying that the police should not be allowed to

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1952], Art. 1
FEDERAL REVIEW
that in four of the five, the certioraris were granted last year,
while the fifth was apparently taken for the purpose of overruling the Murphy opinion of two years ago in a matter of searches
and seizures.
"In other words, the former Court had an interest in criminal procedure, both state and federal, which left an inheritance
now disposed of by this Court. Since January 1, 1950, certiorari
has been granted in only two cases involving the constitutional
aspects of criminal law. It seems safe to predict that this branch
of the law will for a time be swept under the rug of certiorari
denied."
While Professor Frank's forebodings have not, fortunately, been
completely realized, one must note that the number of criminal cases
involving constitutional issues has been substantially reduced by the
later Court. Only flagrant disregard of constitutional rights has caused
the later Court to reverse state decisions.-8 Thus, although this
branch of law has definitely not been swept "under the rug of certiorari denied," the number of such cases heard has become appreciably
smaller.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that refusal to grant certiorari in no way implies an expression on the merits of the decision
of the lower court. Nevertheless one of the effects of such refusal
is to discourage the filing of future or further applications that involve related 9 problems. This gives to the refusal the aspect of an
"affirmance."'1 The reduction of cases heard becomes tremendously

substitute their system of inquisition or protective custody for the safeguards of
a hearing before a magistrate.
IsAs in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). The judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court was reversed on the basis of Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950),
in a per curiam opinion. The inference is that the Negroes in the Shepherd case
had been denied a fair trial by an impartial jury because of the deliberate exclusion

of members of the colored race. The case involved the rape of a white girl by
Negroes in Lake County, Florida, an act which caused great emotional tension and
riot, resulting in the calling out of the National Guard. On the basis of the
situation it would appear that the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, with
whom concurred Justice Frankfurter, is by far the better analysis of the situation.

In effect he points out that the mob violence factor made any semblance of a fair
trial impossible. No Negro, even had one been placed on the jury, would have
dared vote for acquittal.
loIn Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950), Mr. Justice Frankfurter fied
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significant, therefore, in assessing the role of the high tribunal as a
court of criminal appeals. The total number of opinions rendered by
the present Court has not been great when compared with the number
in the days of Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo. This fact makes it
fairly apparent that the Court is seeking to keep its docket at a low
volume. It has accomplished this restrictive process mainly through
the denial of certiorari. It is thus probable that the goal of a reduced
number of cases has been an important factor in lessening the number
of state as well as federal criminal decisions reviewed. The priority
on the docket awarded criminal cases 20 is of slight importance if the
Court refuses to grant certiorari.
Another factor of importance in considering the role of the Court
is the trend of the present Court toward the use of per curiam
opinions. Undoubtedly the use of this device can be explained as
another of the incidents of the burden of the docket. Nevertheless,
such opinions fail to articulate the grounds of the holding and fre-

21
quently result in misunderstanding and doubt among lower courts.

a memorandum pointing out in some detail what the denial of certiorari means:
"The Court has stated again and again what the denial of a petition for writ of
certiorari means and more particularly what it does not mean. Such a denial, it
has been repeatedly stated, 'imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of
the case.' . . . A denial simply means that as a matter of 'sound judicial discretion'
fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision
of the lower court. . . . Obviously it [the denial] does not imply approval of
anything that may have been said by the lower court in support of its decision."
See also the statement of Justice Frankfurter in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 927 (1950), to the same effect.
2OCriminal cases are accorded priority over all others on the Supreme Court
docket except those as to which the United States is a party and "such other
cases as the Court may decide to be of public importance." 28 U.S.C. §2102 (Supp.
1950).
21See, e.g., Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949), reversing 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.
1949). In Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915), the Court had held that the
8th Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments operated on the
Federal Government and not on the states. Chief Judge Biggs held in Johnson v.
Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), that the 14th Amendment prevents the states
from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on their prisoners and that the chain
gang, at least as applied in this case, was exactly within that prohibition. The
per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court reversing Judge Biggs tells absolutely
nothing about the grounds of reversal. The net result is that the lower federal
courts are free to draw their own conclusions. See Application of Middlebrooks,
88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950), in which a district judge relied on Johnson v.
Dye in finding that use of a chain gang constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
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STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL COMITY

The mechanical problem of fitting cases involving important and
far-reaching questions into available time is difficult but not impossible of solution. A compromise with the demands of time can
be effected. Of far greater difficulty is the situation occasioned by the
nature of the relationship between the federal and state courts. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, has well
22
recognized the nature and delicacy of this problem:
"Intervention by this Court in the administration of the
criminal justice of a State has all the disadvantages of interference from without. Whatever short-cut to relief may be had
in a particular case, it is calculated to beget misunderstanding
and friction and to that extent detracts from those imponderables which are the ultimate reliance of a civilized system of
law. After all, this is the Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal,
not a super-legal-aid bureau. If the same relief, although by
a more tedious process, is available through a State's self-corrective process, it enlists the understanding and support of the
community. Considerations rooted in psychological and sociological reason underlie the duty of abstention by this Court
from upsetting convictions by State courts or their refusal to
grant writs of habeas corpus to those under State sentences,
where State action may fairly be attributed to a rule of local
procedure and is not exclusively founded on denial of a federal
claim. When a State court explicitly rests its decision on a
State ground it is easy sailing. But even when a State court
summarily disposes of a case without spelling out its ground,

Be it noted that other issues that were raised in the Johnson case were left equally
unsettled by the Supreme Court.
Professor Frank is much disturbed by the fact that the Court appears to be
using its discretionary power to eliminate consideration of many civil liberties
problems that troubled previous courts. Far from seeing the Court as the great
protector of civil liberties, he sees it as loving "liberty most when it is under
pressure least." Frank, supra note 17, at 20, 40.
22335 U.S. 437, 449 (1948). To the same effect see Jennings v. Illinois, 72 Sup.
Ct. 123,. 127 (1951), and Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 481 (1945) (dissenting
opinions); see also statement of Justice Pitney in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
329 (1915).
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led to do so, as is this Court in many cases, by the burden of
its docket, it is our duty not to attribute to the State court
flouting of the United States Constitution but to infer regard
for its own law .... "
Federal judicial intervention in the criminal procedures of state
courts is presented in particularly acute form by petitions for writ of
habeas corpus following state convictions. It was in 1867 that allowance was first made for applications for habeas corpus to federal
courts whenever the detention violated the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. This provision, substantially incorporated into later law, in effect gave to the Court, however, another
method of review, the scope of which expanded with the passing years.
Thus it became possible, in effect, for federal district courts to serve
in many cases as appellate tribunals reviewing the decisions of state
courts, though it had long been settled that habeas corpus could not
be a substitute for a writ of error.2 3 This perplexing circumstance
led to widespread criticism.24

The device was widely used in the 1930's and early 1940's. In 1943,
1944, and 1945 there were 1570 petitions for writ of habeas corpus
from state prisoners filed in the lower federal courts, a number sufficient to impose a strain on federal judges and threaten "harmonious
relations between state and federal judiciaries."25 The allegations of
the various petitions were in many cases wholly specious, but each
petitioner had to receive the opportunity to prove them.2 6 Any person
"willing to make oath he had been denied a fair trial" had the right
27
to attempt to prove the fact.

23CoIlins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915).
24See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALs IN AMERICA

249 (1939);

STERN AND

GRESSMAN,

265-269 (1950).
25Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172 (1948);
Fraenkel, The Function of the Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties,
SUPREME COURT PRAcTIcE

13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 132, 135 (1948).

26Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329
(1941). Federal District Judge Goodman felt in 1947 that the writ was being subjected to abuse thiough the filing of large numbers of nonmeritorious and repetitious petitions. His jurisdiction included Alcatraz, source of large numbers of
such petitions. See Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7
F.R.D. 313 (1948). For a comment on the legal ramifications involved in allegations of abuse of the writ see 2 U. OF FLA. L. Rav. 148 (1949).
27Parker, supra note 25.
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As a consequence, the new judicial code of 1948 provided: 28
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
The effect of these provisions, coupled with interpretation by the
Court, has been principally to
"....

provide that review of state court action be had so far as

possible by the Supreme Court of the United States, whose
review of such action has historical basis, and that review
not be had by lower federal courts, whose exercise of such
power is unseemly and likely to breed dangerous conflicts of
29
jurisdiction.."
Thus the proper remedy, when the petitioner is finally denied
relief by the state courts, is an application for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.30 The purpose of adhering to this procedure
is to avoid review of state decisions by lower federal courts.
2828 U.S.C. §2254 (Supp. 1950).
2sParker, supra note 25, at 176. See Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir. 1947).
30A question, now apparently settled, revolved around the issue of whether,
as a part of the "exhaustion of state remedies," it was necessary to apply for
certiorari from the Supreme Court to the highest state court. Ex parte Hawk,
321 U.S. 114 (1944), had held that application for certiorari was a necessity before
habeas corpus might be invoked. The case of Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948),
indicated that the reverse might be true. Mr. Justice Murphy, who wrote the
majority opinion, felt that there had been no abuse by federal district judges of
their power to grant petitions of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners and that
application to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari was not properly a
part of the exhaustion of state remedies. Justice Reed wrote the dissenting opinion, at p. 684, concurred in by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Jackson and
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PARTICULAR ISSUES IN STATE CRIMINAL APPEALS

In answering the question of whether state courts have violated
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has ranged beyond the confines of the record of the trial. Thus in Moore v. Dempsey3 l on a review of a dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus the Court declared
that mere compliance with the forms of due process was not enough
and that a fundamental principle of justice had been denied because

Burton. See United States ex rel. White v. Walsh, 174 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949),
rev'd, 338 U.S. 804 (1949). In Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949),
the Wade rule was followed.
In 1950 the minority position of Justice Reed in the Wade case became the
position of the Court in Darr v. Burford. 339 U.S. 200. Justice Reed, for the new
majority, held that Ex parte Hawk stated the settled rule, and specifically overruled Wade v. Mayo. It was Reed's contention that the Judiciary Act of 1948 gave
expression to the rule of Ex parte Hawk. Justice Frankfurter dissented, with
Justices Black and Douglas agreeing with his view. He said pungently that the
great writ of liberty "ought not to be treated as though we were playing a game."
Id. at 225.
Professor Frank, supra note 17, at 26, feels that this rule "puts another blind
alley in the labyrinth of procedures already confronting the convicted." Fraenkel,
supra note 25, at 136, said, after the decision in Ex parte Hawk and before the
decision in Wade v. Mayo:
" . . the rule that application must first be made to the state courts in
effect destroys the right to apply to the lower federal courts at all. If the
state court grants a hearing and decides the facts against the contention
of the convicted man, no other court is likely to review this determination
or grant another hearing. If the state court refuses a hearing on the ground
the claim made by the accused raises no constitutional issue and the Supreme
Court refuses to review on certiorari, it is pretty certain no lower federal
court will thereafter grant relief and most unlikely that the Supreme Court
will then take the case. It is only where the state court confesses itself powerless under state procedure to grant relief that direct application to federal
courts is possible. This is seldom likely to happen; hence the right to apply
to a lower federal court has become an illusory one."
It would most certainly appear that, although Fraenkel may state the case too
strongly, the burden of the petitioner is incomparably more difficult under the
present rule. In Frisbie v. Collins, 72 Sup. Ct. 509, 511 (1952), Mr. Justice Black
said of the rule of Darr v. Burford: ".... this general rule is not rigid and inflexible;
the district court may deviate from it and grant relief in special circumstances.
Whether such circumstances exist calls for a factual appraisal by the court in
each special situation."
a,261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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of mob pressure during trial. Earlier, in Frank v. Mangum,3 2 the
Court took jurisdiction under somewhat similar circumstances but
arrived at an opposite result on the merits. Holmes, who was to write
the opinion in Moore v. Dempsey, made the famous Frank case the
occasion for a strong dissent.
The Court has frequently said that a conviction based on a confession obtained by coercion, brutality, and violence constitutes a violation of due process. 33 It has been held that a penal statute creating
a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to
it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties or it will be
deemed repugnant to due process. 34 State laws that create unreasonable presumptions have been stamped as unconstitutional. 35 The
Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to discriminate systematically against any racial or religious groups in the
make-up of juries, 36 although the "blue ribbon" jury practice of New
York State was held valid on the ground that no discrimination had
3
been established. 7
A brief consideration of the issue of right to counsel 3s illustrates
32237 U.S. 309 (1915).
-3Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274
(1946); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936). A recent discussion of the issue is found in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 72
Sup. Ct. 141 (1951). In Rochin v. California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952), the Court
held invalid as a violation of due process a conviction resulting from the use of
evidence "brutally and forcefully" obtained by inducing vomiting so that the accused expelled two capsules of morphine which he had swallowed in an unsuccessful
attempt to conceal them from searching officers. Justices Black and Douglas concurred separately, arguing that obtaining evidence in such a manner compelled the
accused to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. They would
incorporate the restraints of the Fifth Amendment into the due process clause
of the Fourteenth. Id. at 211, 212. Logic would say, if the Court did not, that
this is an instance where confession was "coerced."
S4Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). The New Jersey statute, Laws
1934, c. 155, §4, in essence made it an offense to be a "gangster."
asPollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942);
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
30Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1948).
But cf. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
37Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948), 1 U. oF FLA. L. Rrv. 448 (1948);
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). Four judges dissented in each case.
ssFor definitive articles on the right to counsel, see Fellman, The Constitutional
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well the Court in the process of acting as a court of criminal appeals.
Powell v. Alabama3- established the principle that, at least in capital
cases, the accused has a right to counsel of his own choice. Thus, in
proceedings in a state court by which a 17-year-old boy was arraigned,
tried, and convicted on a plea of guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder, all in the same day and without assistance of counsel or advice as to right of counsel, without an explanation of the consequences of a plea of guilty and without evidence in
his own behalf or cross-examination of the state's witnesses, the Court
had no difficulty in saying that the accused had been denied due process. 40 Lack or denial of counsel to an inexperienced youth4l or to
one incapable of adequately defending himself,42 or the obtaining of
a guilty plea by misrepresentation from one without counsel,' 3 even
in noncapital cases, has been held to violate due process.
Betts v. Brady,44 however, rejects the contention that the Fourteenth Amendment automatically requires counsel. 4 5 The majority
upheld the conviction at a trial in which the state refused to provide
counsel for an accused indicted for robbery, on the ground that it
Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REv. 559 (1951), The Federal
Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. REv. 15 (1951).
39287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4ODeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
41Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (accused not advised of his
right to counsel and no attempt made by trial court to make him understand
the consequences of his plea of guilty to crimes of burglary carrying a maximum
sentence of 80 years).
42Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Palmer v. Ashe, 72 Sup. Ct. 191
(1951). This issue is discussed in Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Townsend
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
43Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
44316 U.S. 455 (1941).
4SQuicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948) (guilty plea from uncounseled defendant); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134
(1947) (defendants pleaded guilty after being informed of the consequences, but
no offer of counsel was made by court); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946),
follow the principle of Betts v. Brady. In the Quicksall case the defendant pleaded
guilty to first degree murder. He made no request for counsel and none was
offered by the trial court. The Supreme Court felt that the fact that the defendant was intelligent, mature, and had "prior court experience" made him well
aware of what was transpiring; therefore due process was not violated. In the
Caster case the Court held that the defendant knew what he was doing when he
pleaded guilty without advice of counsel; hence there was no infringement of
due process.
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was the practice to furnish counsel for indigent defendants only in
prosecutions for murder or rape. The intelligence of the accused and
his ability to present his defense are material elements of the decision.
Justices Black, Murphy, and Douglas dissented. Justice Black's view
was that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to
the states, an opinion consistent with his oft-repeated views on the
subject. 46 Later, in Gibbs v. Burke47 and dissenting in Foster v.
Illinois,46 he was to state the view that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.
The Court is thus seen as taking a pragmatic approach which considers all of the circumstances in each case. The guiding principle
which the Court applies when the right of counsel is raised as an
issue is one of whether the lack of counsel injected an ingredient of
unfairness which operated actively in the process that resulted in conviction.
CONCLUSION

Thus in a variety of areas we see the Court developing standards
applicable to state procedure in criminal proceedings - serving precisely the function of a high court of criminal appeals. Chief Justice
Vinson's words in speaking of the work of the Supreme Court gen49
erally are applicable to this immediate discussion:
"The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily
concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions.
In almost all cases within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, the
petitioner has already received one appellate review of his case.
... The function of the Supreme Court is, therefore, to resolve
conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen among

4GThe requirement of counsel guaranteed in the 6th Amendment is, of course,
applicable in federal criminal proceedings, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
47337 U.S. 773, 782 (1949).
48332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947). In the Foster case, at p. 140, Justice Black said of
Betts v. Brady: "That case is precedent for this one. But it is the kind of precedent that I had hoped this Court would not perpetuate." Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 682 (1948), called Betts v. Brady "illstarred" and suggested that it was the "need for counsel that establishes the real
standard for determining whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial unfair."
4969 Sup Ct. v, vi (1949).
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lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to
exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts. If we took
every case in which an interesting legal question is raised, or
our prima facie impression is that the decision below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the Constitutional and statutory
responsibilities placed upon the Court. To remain effective,
the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases
which present questions whose resolution will have immediate
importance far beyond the particular facts and parties
involved."

It is possible to mark certain trends of the Supreme Court in the
review of state criminal judgments. The tendency to restrict the
grant of certiorari, limitations on the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus by federal courts, the qualifications placed on the right to
counsel in trials before state courts - these are concrete indications
that the Court in the immediate future may not be so greatly concerned with criminal matters raising constitutional issues as it has
been in the past.
The ultimate problem is one of American federalism - the nature
of the relationship between state and federal courts. The members
of the Supreme Court must not fall into the habit of shedding unwelcome responsibility by a too frequent use of the shield of "comity
in the federal system." But if the justices sometimes appear to err
by the dismissal of appeals from criminal proceedings in state courts
on technical grounds, the idea of comity will explain, if it will not
justify, such dismissals.
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